When a x-ray image is needed during surgery, clinicians may stop the anesthesia machine ventilator while the exposure is made. If the ventilator is not restarted promptly, the patient may experience severe complications. This paper explores the interconnection of a ventilator and simulated x-ray into a prototype plug-and-play medical device system. This work assists ongoing interoperability framework development standards efforts to develop functional and non-functional requirements and illustrates the potential patient safety benefits of interoperable medical device systems by implementing a solution to a clinical use case requiring interoperability.
Introduction
Medical devices are a key element in the modern health care environment. They assist medical staff by automatically measuring physiologic parameters such as blood pressure, oxygen level, and heart rate, or actively influence these parameters by means of infusion pumps for analgesia and insulin or ventilators for breathing support. Almost all modern medical care rely on electronic medical devices.
Despite the pervasive use of medical devices throughout modern health care, most devices work on their own and in isolation. In contrast, interoperable devices would allow connections for sharing patient data, device status, and enabling external control, even between devices from different manufacturers. Such interoperability would lead to clear benefits for the care provider and the patient such as more accurate assessment of the patient's health and errorresilient systems through safety interlocks, closedloop control, and automatic hot swappable backups.
To realize these benefits, the MD PnP program at the Center for Integration of Medicine & Innova-tive Technology at the Massachusetts General Hospital (CIMIT.org) has been developing techniques and standards to facilitate medical device interoperability via MD PnP (Medical Device Plug-and-Play), similar to the plug-and-play of PC devices. This paper describes a prototype MD PnP case study that was conducted for two purposes: (1) for the MD PnP program to extrapolate functional and non-functional requirements for the interoperability standards in progress, and more importantly, (2) to develop a demo interoperable medical device system which would illustrate the benefits of the work by implementing a solution to a clinical use case requiring interoperability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the clinical use case which motivated this case study. Our problem statement and challenges are in Section 3. Section 4 describes the details of our system implementation, and Section 5 tells how we modeled and verified the system and generated code from the model. Finally, our conclusions are in Section 6.
Clinical Use Case
This project was driven by a specific clinical use case. This use case was documented by the Anesthesia Patient Safety Foundation to illustrate a potential safety problem with the way x-ray images are usually taken during surgery.
A 32-year-old woman had a laparoscopic cholecystectomy [gall bladder removal] performed under general anesthesia. At the surgeons request, a plane film x-ray was shot during a cholangiogram [bile duct image]. The anesthesiologist stopped the ventilator for the film. The x-ray technician was unable to remove the film because of its position beneath the table. The anesthesiologist attempted to help her, but found it difficult because the gears on the table had jammed. Finally, the x-ray was removed, and the surgical procedure recommenced. At some point, the anesthesiologist glanced at the EKG and noticed severe bradycardia. He realized he had never restarted the ventilator. This patient ultimately expired. (Lofsky, 2004) It is common practice to stop the anesthesia machine ventilator for a short time during surgery when this type of x-ray is performed. This ensures that the patient's chest and abdomen are not moving when the exposure is made, thus providing a sharper image. This does not harm the patient provided that the ventilator is restarted promptly. Difficulties arise only if the ventilator is not restarted for some reason. This kind of problem can be mitigated by using interconnected devices. If the anesthesia machine ventilator can synchronize with the x-ray, then it is no longer necessary to manually stop the ventilator to make the exposure.
Synchronization between a camera and external devices like a flash is not new. Typically, the camera sends a trigger signal to the flash at the right time. Similarly, the ventilator could synchronize with the x-ray machine. Since ventilators are not built to send synchronized signals to x-ray machines, we designed our system to have a third device which sits between the ventilator and x-ray, reads status messages from the ventilator, and makes the decision about when to trigger the x-ray. This third component is called the supervisor and is described in detail in Section 4. Systems which synchronize x-rays and ventilators have been built in the past, see for instance (Langevin et al., 1999) , but these systems must be built one at a time for specific devices and are limited to experimental use. Ventilators and x-ray machines are manufactured by many companies. Cross-manufacturer interoperability would allow synchronized systems to be built from any combination of devices that support the functionality. The aim of the MD PnP program is to develop techniques and standards that facilitate medical device interoperability in order to allow such systems to be easily assembled and used clinically.
Problem statement and challenges
Our goal was to explore the safety and engineering issues involved in building a system that would allow the x-ray machine to take a clear image of the patient without the need to turn off the ventilator. Furthermore, we wanted to build a system which would illustrate the benefits of interoperability in the medical domain. Interoperable medical devices are devices which are capable of connecting to each other to share data or to allow external control. Such devices must have an external interface, and the design of these interfaces is the subject of several ongoing standards processes such as ISO/IEC 11073, Health Level 7 (HL7), and others. The use case we addressed specifically requires interoperability supporting external control. The implementation we developed is not intended to be used clinically. This project is essentially a research platform for understanding the core issues with interfacing these devices in this particular use case.
Most medical devices currently manufactured are not designed to be interoperable. The challenges we faced in building this system are generally faced by anyone trying to connect medical devices and are a major reason such interconnection is not more common. Medical devices generally have proprietary interfaces which are only documented in technical manuals or other material not openly available. We were fortunate to have the cooperation of Dräger, the manufacturer of the ventilator we used. The interface of the ventilator was designed to be used for diagnosis of machine faults and to send data to the electronic medical record, not as a source of real-time status information. Thus, it runs at a relatively slow rate, and the low maximum sample rate (5 -10 samples per second) was the limiting factor in designing our control algorithm.
A further challenge in interconnecting medical systems is proving the safety of the resultant system. Safety is defined as freedom from unnecessary risk, where risks are unmitigated hazards. FDA provides guidance on risk minimization for medical devices. The risk assessment process starts with a hazards analysis or failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA). These documents gather potential hazards and their mitigations, that are used in writing requirements and safety properties. The risk analysis process and how we used hazards to derive safety properties with which to verify the system is described in Section 5.
Our development process started with informal system requirements which were used to build a state machine model of the desired system behavior. We checked this model for safety properties using model checking software and then generated code from the model to produce the supervisor. Figure 1 shows the overall architecture of our approach. This architecture follows closely that of the draft standard for integrating the clinical environment (hereafter referred to as ICE) (ASTM F29 WK19878, 2008) . The major components are a set of medical devices, a network controller, a supervisor, the patient, and a caregiver. Medical devices connect to each other and the supervisor through the network controller. The devices' connections to the network controller may go through physical adapters and data format converters if their connectors and formats are not directly compatible. The network controller may also connect to an external network such as a hospital information system. The supervisor runs the control software for the system. Supervisor software for our system is the subject of Section 4.2. The supervisor hosts the user interface for the caregiver and may also contain a data logger, which records network activity and information from the devices.
System Description
MD PnP requires three phases of operations each with its own safety, security, and functional requirements. The first phase is device discovery and connection establishment, when devices are first connected to a MD PnP network. When a new device is connected to the network, the device's capabilities need to be communicated to the rest of the system. The second phase is normal operation of the plugand-play system. During this phase, the devices transmit data they produce and receive commands or data from other parts of the system. The final phase is disconnection. When devices are removed from the system, the supervisor must decide how to respond. If the device was necessary for continued operation of the supervisor program, then the supervisor might notify the user and shut down. If the device was not necessary, the supervisor might be able to continue operating in a limited manner. Our system implementation, which follows the conceptual architecture, is shown in Figure 2 . The devices we used were a Dräger anesthesia machine ventilator and a simulated x-ray machine. The role of network controller and adapter is filled by the LiveData RTI software program. LiveData Inc. is a company which produces software to integrate medical devices for common display data. We worked with LiveData to connect the ventilator and simulated xray. Their software translates the proprietary medical device formats and makes the data available through a single interface.
The supervisor program runs on the same computer as the LiveData RTI software. Finally, the patient was represented with a physical lung simulator consisting of a bellows and spring. While a simple lung simulator does not capture all the nuances of a real patient, it is sufficient for this application. Lung movement is the factor we can control in taking a clear x-ray, and a supervisor which can synchronize with a simulated lung can be expected to do the same with a real patient.
Our demo is not a full MD PnP system. It is an interconnected medical device system rather than an interoperable system. An interconnected system is one in which devices are functionally connected through an interface. It differs from an interoperable system in that the devices are hard-coded. The system is built around specific devices and will not operate with other, similar devices. It also does not fully implement the three phases described above. The demo is designed to illustrate the possibilities of interconnected systems and show the kinds of systems which interoperability would permit. It is not possible at this time to build a fully interoperable MD PnP system, since the standards are still under development. We believe that limited systems such as this demo still have value in identifying functional and non-functional requirements for the standards in progress and illustrating the benefits of the interoperability work. 
Hardware
The system consists of three major hardware components. These are an anesthesia machine ventilator, an x-ray machine, and a supervisor computer. The ventilator breathes for the patient by pumping gas into their lungs and allowing them to exhale on their own. The x-ray machine takes radiographs, and the supervisor coordinates the actions of the other components. Each of these devices has its own physical interface and communication protocol, all of which are different. Medical devices are not generally developed with the intention of interconnection. Any external interfaces which are present are usually used for logging status information or debugging. There is presently little incentive for manufacturers to follow standards in building these interfaces, and few standards for them to follow. Thus, a wide range of interfaces are found on various devices. A fourth component is the LiveData server, which translates formats between the other devices. The LiveData server communicates with the anesthesia machine ventilator using Dräger's MediBus protocol over a 9600 baud serial line, with the x-ray machine using the Modbus protocol over ethernet, and with the supervisor using SOAP on HTTP on TCP/IP over ethernet.
The x-ray machine is simulated using a PLC controller, a webcam, a small red light, and a pushbutton. The PLC allows the light to be turned on and off and the pushbutton's status to be read over ethernet. The webcam is a standard USB webcam which is controlled using proprietary software.
The supervisor computer, LiveData server, and PLC are connected with a standard ethernet switch. In our demo, the supervisor software and LiveData server were usually run on the same computer.
Software
The system's software is divided between the supervisor and the LiveData server. The supervisor controls the other devices in the system -it correlates information from the other devices and makes the decision when to trigger the x-ray. Supervisors in general are responsible for implementing the parts of the system which are specific to a particular clinical scenario. The supervisor checks to see whether the required devices are present, collects data from the various connected devices, and sends commands to the devices according to the particular scenario. For this demo, the supervisor gathers data from the ventilator and sends the signal to trigger an x-ray exposure.
The LiveData server receives SOAP requests from the supervisor and translates them into requests to individual devices in their proprietary formats, then takes the replies from the devices and formats them as SOAP responses.
The development of the supervisor software is described in more detail in Section 5.
SOAP
The SOAP interface is used for communication between the supervisor and the LiveData server. A typical SOAP transaction goes as follows:
1. the user requests the list of variables from the LiveData server 2. they use the generic get or set methods to do operations on those variables 3. the server receives the command, translates it to the Dräger MediBus protocol used for the ventilator, and sends the command along 4. the ventilator sends its response to the server, which translates it and passes the response to the user 5. the response is returned in an XML wrapper which contains typing information for the returned values SOAP is a standard protocol for web services. We used it here primarily because it was supported by the LiveData program. It worked well enough for this application, which had relatively slow data rates and small amounts of data being passed, but it does have appreciable overhead. All queries and responses are passed as XML messages which need to be generated on the sending side and parsed when received.
Another issue was the latency of the SOAP server. Some of the latency is inherent in encoding and decoding XML messages and in passing the messages through a translator instead of directly sending them from one device to another. Additional latency in our demo system resulted from a commonly used congestion control method. When many small packets are sent over a TCP/IP network, the data being sent is a small portion of the transmitted packet -most of the packet is taken up with headers. This can lead to the network becoming congested when small packets are sent quickly.
Nagle's algorithm (Nagle, 1984 ) is used to concatenate these small packets together to reduce overall network overhead at the expense of delayed message delivery. The data in many small packets can be bundled into one large packet, reducing the overhead but increasing the transmission time of the early packets. In this context, we had plenty of bandwidth and were much more concerned about the timely delivery of messages, so turning off this feature greatly reduced the latency of the SOAP server.
Synchronization Algorithms
The supervisor uses information from the ventilator to decide when to trigger the x-ray. The synchronization algorithm defines exactly how this decision is made. Figure 3 shows the respiratory cycle graphed as pressure over time. The pressure increases until the end of inspiration (at time Tinsp after start of breath), at which point it drops off quickly through expiration. There is usually a pause between the end of exhalation and the start of the next breath. For this case study, we want to support taking an x-ray when the 'lung' was not moving significantly. This occurs when the patient is relatively still at the peak of inspiration or between the end of expiration and the start of the next breath. An exposure is possible if the time the patient is still exceeds the time needed for the exposure plus the latency between triggering the x-ray and the actual exposure. 
Synchronization Method 1: Dead Reckoning
The first method used to determine when to trigger the x-ray is simple dead reckoning using the time of last breath, time of inspiration, and frequency. The variables used for this method are shown in Figure 4 . All times are in seconds. If we know the time of the start of the last breath and the frequency of breathing, then it is trivial to calculate the time of the start of the next breath.
T nb = T lb + 60/ f req
(1) There is probably time to trigger the x-ray just before start of the next breath, as long as the patient has finished exhaling before the start of the next inhalation.
T trig = T nb − T exp − T delta
(2) We can check whether the patient has actually finished exhaling by sampling the instantaneous flow rate just before the start of the next breath. If it is close to zero, then the patient is not inhaling or exhaling and is still enough to allow taking the x-ray. This method of synchronization makes many assumptions. The most critical assumption is that the respiratory frequency is not going to change between the last breath and the next one. If it does, or if the system setup changes in other ways, this method of synchronization will not work. The check of instantaneous flow rate should prevent the system from triggering the x-ray when the patient is moving, but the system may not be able to take an image in situations where a different synchronization method would allow an exposure.
Get values of the variables T now , T lb , f req

Synchronization Method 2: Dynamic
Another way to calculate the trigger time is to sample the real-time flow rate rapidly enough to build a picture of the flow graph. We experimented with two techniques for doing this. The variables used in the following descriptions are listed in Table 5 We originally envisioned sampling at a high enough rate to be able to integrate the total flow volume by multiplying the sampled flow rate by the time interval of the samples. This would allow the supervisor to trigger the x-ray at the right time no matter what changes were made to the ventilator's programming or how the patient reacted. However, the ventilator was not able to provide samples at a high enough rate to enable this method to be used. The SOAP server and interface introduced additional latency and jitter into the samples, which further reduced their usefulness for this purpose.
Our second idea was to use the slope of the flow signal to find when inspiration is about to end. This meant taking two or more samples, calculating the rate of change of the flow rate between them, and triggering when this rate of change was low enough. The problem we ran into here is that the flow graph tails off very rapidly, making it unlikely that we would get even a pair of samples in the short time when the breath is about to end. The low sample rate made this problem worse.
1. prime S last , T last , S current , T current with two consecutive samples
7. if slope < T hreshold and f low is near 0, trigger x-ray else loop back to 2.
In the end, we found that dynamic synchronization is possible only at relatively low respiratory rates -under 8 to 10 breaths per minute. The dead reckoning method functions at much higher rates, up to approximately 25 to 30 bpm depending on the other ventilator settings. The supervisor program for our demo checks the respiratory rate and chooses whether to use the dynamic or dead reckoning method accordingly.
Alarms
The system should not trigger the x-ray if the ventilator has active alarms. The ventilator will take care of displaying the alarm condition to the caregiver and sounding alarms, so the supervisor just has to detect that the ventilator has active alarms and not trigger the x-ray on that respiratory cycle. It does this by getting a summary of all active alarms and warnings from the ventilator. If the list of active alarms is not empty, then the supervisor will not trigger the x-ray. This technique is easy to implement and covers the most common situation where the alarm sounds sometime before the supervisor decides to trigger the x-ray. This is sufficient for the demo, but an implementation with a real x-ray machine and a real patient would have to take into account factors such as the alarm being raised after the supervisor checks the alarm status but before the exposure is made.
In the case where this happens, many conditions which would cause a ventilator alarm will not affect the synchronization algorithm. These include alarms like low gas levels, overpressure, some sensor failures, etc. Any alarm that does not indicate an unexpected change in ventilator settings will not stop the supervisor from being able to synchronize. Alarms for major mechanical malfunctions are very rare, but would indicate conditions where we would not want an exposure to be made -though any failure which stopped the ventilator from operating would mean that the patient's chest was not moving. The problem with taking an exposure during an alarm is not that the image would be blurred, but that the safety of any caregivers responding to the alarm could be compromised. Caregivers are also protected by the use of a 'dead man switch' that the x-ray technician holds during the exposure. If the switch is released, the xray will not be taken. The time interval where there was an active alarm and the exposure was being made would be a fraction of a second, but this should be taken into account in the risk management process.
Any system using a real x-ray machine would also need to take into account alarms from the x-ray, and any system using medical devices which are capable of pushing alarms rather than having them polled (as we did with this ventilator) would also need to consider possible race conditions between the alarm handling and synchronization parts of the supervisor.
Modeling, Verification, and Code Generation
The software for the supervisor is the key element of the system. The supervisor is the new piece which facilitates communication between the other devices. As was described in Section 4.2, the supervisor's role in this demo is to gather data from the ventilator, decide when to trigger the x-ray, and send the signal to the x-ray machine at the correct time. The supervisor interacts with the caregiver to get input such as whether to make the exposure during inspiration or expiration and to provide the caregiver with status information and, ultimately, with the x-ray image.
The functioning of the supervisor program is critical to the safety of the system, so we devoted a significant amount of time and effort to ensuring its correctness.
The supervisor software development process started with gathering informal requirements. These requirements were collected during discussions with caregivers and biomedical engineers and included functional requirements such as "when the exposure is made, the red light on the x-ray box should light up" and safety requirements like "the caregiver's xray trigger button must be held down for the x-ray exposure to be made". These requirements were refined and expanded upon throughout the development process. For instance, when we started development we did not know that we would need a dead-reckoning synchronization algorithm in addition to the dynamic method and thus did not include any requirements about when the supervisor should use one or the other of these techniques.
A state machine model of the supervisor was built and then verified to meet essential safety properties. We used the model to generate Java code which then ran the demo. This development process is described in more detail in the following sections.
We began by modeling the supervisor program as an extended finite state machine (EFSM). This format was chosen because it is expressive enough to capture the behavior of the program and tools are available to automatically translate the EFSM specification into the input languages of a number of tools.
Verification. Once the system was modeled as a state machine, we used a tool to translate it into the input format for the model checker UPPAAL. The model checker was used to simulate the system, to test the system for general properties like deadlock, and to test more specific properties. These activities suggested changes to the EFSM specification, and the process went though several iterations. Eventually, we produced an EFSM specification which satisfied all the safety requirements.
The safety requirements for the system were gathered by talking with clinicians and working though an informal hazard analysis process. For a device intended for use with patients, this process would be much more thorough.
The primary hazard introduced by this system is triggering the x-ray at the wrong time. This could potentially endanger the x-ray technician or other clinicians. Triggering the x-ray when the patient is moving will result in a blurred x-ray and the need to take another exposure, meaning additional radiation exposure for the patient. Another hazard is that an image might not be taken even though it is possible. This is less significant, since the system will inform the clinician that the exposure was not possible and try again on the next breath. The exposure is delayed slightly, but this is a small cost compared to that of a failed exposure. The EFSM model of the system was checked for structural properties like deadlock (that the system can't get 'stuck') and for specific safety properties. These focused on when the x-ray is triggered, since this is the single safety-critical action the system takes. We checked that the trigger signal was sent only at the correct time (as described in the algorithms in 4.4.1 and 4.4.2) and that the system would not trigger unless the flow rate reported by the ventilator was near zero.
AG xray = exposing implies T now = T nb − T exp − T δ (3) Formula 3 is used for checking the system when it is being used to make an exposure at the peak of expiration (the lung is empty) in dead reckoning mode. This specification is in linear temporal logic (LTL) and it says that whenever the x-ray machine is in a state where it is exposing (AG xray = exposing) the current time must be the time of the next breath minus the exposure time minus a small offset (T now = T nb − T exp − T δ ). This means that if there is any possible way that the EFSM could have the xray in the state 'exposing' when it is not that time, the model checker will show it as a counterexample. Similar formulas are used for checking exposure times for inspiration.
AG xray=exposing implies f low <= f low threshold (4) Formula 4 states that when the x-ray is exposing, the instantaneous flow rate must be less than the flow threshold. This threshold is defined to be low enough that the lung will not be moving enough to blur the image, but also high enough to allow an exposure when there are very small movements.
Implementation Generation. The final EFSM specification was used to automatically generate Java code which was used in the demo implementation. The demo includes a handwritten GUI frontend which is the user interface and the supervisor application, which is largely generated code. The generated code interacts with some handwritten functions which perform low-level actions. For instance, the model simply uses values like f low, while the generated code replaces references to such variables with calls to handwritten library functions which actually provide the values.
Demo. The demo starts with a screen describing the clinical use case. This is followed by giving the user a choice of taking an image at the peak of inspiration (when the lungs are full) or the peak of expiration (when the lungs are empty). The user is asked to confirm their choice and taken to a screen describing the image-taking process. The user is asked to play the role of an x-ray technician and to pick up a physical button which they will hold while the exposure is made. In a non-synchronized x-ray, this button would trigger the x-ray directly. In our system, the button is held down to give the system permission to make the exposure. The clinician holds the button for several seconds while the system waits for the lung to reach the proper phase of respiration and the system checks to make sure the button is held before taking an image. If the clinician decides that it is not safe to make an exposure (e.g., if someone walks into the room), they can simply release the button and no exposure will occur. This allows us to keep a human in the loop as an additional safety precaution. Assuming the button is held down, when the lung reaches the proper phase the exposure is made and the webcam image is displayed on the screen.
The system consisted of many components from a variety of sources, written in several languages. The main difficulty in implementing the demo was integrating these diverse components into a single, functional system. As was described in Section 4, the system was tied together using LiveData and SOAP.
While there were significant disadvantages to this approach (especially in terms of latency), we were successful in making a working demo. This demo was shown at the CIMIT Innovation Congress and as a Scientific Exhibit at the American Society of Anesthesiologists annual meeting and presented at the High Confidence Medical Devices, Software and Systems and Medical Device Plug-and-Play Interoperability workshop (Arney et al., 2007) .
Conclusion
We successfully built a system which was able to synchronize the ventilator with a simulated x-ray machine, demonstrating that the approach is feasible. In the process, we learned lessons for building more general systems. These include the importance of recognizing the limitations of device interfaces in the supervisor algorithm design and the need to have supervisors which can respond to the changing settings of the devices. We had two synchronization algorithms, one which was more accurate but only usable at low breath rates and a less accurate but faster algorithm for high breath rates. We used formal methods in the development of the supervisor and have presented a methodology for ensuring that the integrated device systems meet their specified safety properties.
This work started with an unfortunate use case, resulting from the lack of a respiratory pause feature on the ventilator and the ventilator's inability to synchronize with the x-ray machine. The exposure that our demos brought to this problem has led to a proposed change to the international anesthesia workstation standard. Hopefully in the future such changes and the introduction of safe, inter-connected systems will help to improve patient safety.
